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The Human Genome Project provides government funds for the
generation of vast amounts of information in the hope that the informa-
tion will ultimately be used to develop new products and processes for
the diagnosis and treatment of human disease.' Much of this informa-
tion is generated in government and university laboratories that cannot
undertake the downstream research and development necessary to
translate basic research discoveries into commercial products. Technol-
ogy transfer to the private sector is thus a prerequisite to the develop-
ment of genome-related products, but achieving technology transfer in
such a project is a matter of some complexity.
Some of the difficulties involved are suggested by the reaction of
industry trade groups to the filing of patent applications by the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) on thousands of partial complemen-
tary DNA (cDNA) sequences of unknown function that were identified
in government laboratories.2 The research that led to the controversial
patent applications consisted of taking randomly selected copies of
genes that were being expressed in human brain tissue and finding the
DNA sequence for small portions of those genes, without knowing what
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B. Stanford University (1975);
J.D. University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall) (1979).
1. The Human Genome Project is a jointly sponsored effort of the National Institutes of
Health and the Department of Energy to create a detailed map of human DNA, which would
identify the location and nucleotide sequence of all human genes and the intergenic regions that
connect them. This information has potentially enormous benefits for the understanding and treat-
ment of human disease, including the development of new methods of diagnosing and treating
diseases that have a genetic component, such as hereditary forms of cancer, Alzheimer's disease,
manic-depressive illness, Huntington's disease and cystic fibrosis. See NATIONAL RES COUNCIL,
MAPPING AND SEQUENCING THE HUMAN GENOME (1988); US. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH ASSESS-
MENT. MAPPING OUR GENES-THE GENOME PROJECTS How BIG, How FAST? (1988).
2. See Reid G. Adler, Genome Research: Fulfilling the Public's Expectations for Knowl-
edge and Commercialization, 257 SCIENCE 908, 910 (1992); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Pat-
ents, and Product Development, 257 SCIENCE 903 (1992); Bernadine Healy, Special Report on
Gene Patenting, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 664, 666-67 (1992); Thomas D. Kiley, Patents on Ran-
dom Complementary DNA Fragments?, 257 SCIENCE 915 (1992).
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proteins or functions are associated with the genes. Beginning in the
summer of 1991, NIH filed patent applications claiming the partial
DNA sequences as well as the full genes to which they correspond,
which, according to the NIH patent application, could be readily ob-
tained with the partial sequence information. The primary avowed pur-
pose of seeking these patent rights was to be able to offer licenses to
firms in order to promote the commercial development of products re-
lated to the sequences.3
Some of the NIH patent applications were rejected by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The new leadership of NIH de-
cided not to appeal the rejections and withdrew the remaining claims.4
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to reflect upon this controversy as a case
study in the role of patents in technology transfer.
The patent applications generated considerable controversy among
scientists throughout the world. Scientists charged that the human gen-
ome represents the universal heritage of humanity and should be dedi-
cated to the public domain, and that intellectual property rights could
undermine scientific collaborations thereby retarding progress in the
Human Genome Project.' What was striking about this controversy is
that the patent applications were also opposed by trade groups from the
industry that NIH intended to benefit through technology transfer.
These trade groups were not composed of naive, idealistic scientists
who have limited experience with patents and limited interest in prod-
uct development, but of hard-nosed, profit-maximizing firms. Yet posi-
tion statements from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association,
the Industrial Biotechnology Association and the Association of Bio-
technology Companies expressed views on the NIH patent applications
that contradicted the claim that patent protection for those particular
3. Healy, supra note 2, at 665.
4. See Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bid for Gene Patents, 263 SCIENCE 909 (1994);
Diane Gershon, U.S. and British Researchers Agree Not to Seek Gene Fragment Patents, 367
NATURE 583 (1994); Natalie Angier, U.S. Dropping Its Effort to Patent Thousands of Genetic
Fragments, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, § A, at 16.
5. See, e.g., David Dickson, UK Clinical Geneticists Ask for Ban on the Patenting of
Human Genes, 366 NATURE 391 (1993); Cesar Milstein, Patents on Scientific Discoveries Are
Unfair and Potentially Dangerous, THE SCIENTIST, Nov. 1, 1993, at 11; Earl Lane, Debate Over
Gene Patent Application: Scientists Argue NIH's Claim Will Choke a Free Flow of Data, NEws-
DAY, May 19, 1992, at 57; Richard Saltus, Scientists Criticize NIH Bid for Patent on Gene
Fragments, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 1992, at 26. Much of the controversy within the scien-
tific community has been a reprise of an old debate about the impact of intellectual property
rights on research science norms. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 180-95 (1987).
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discoveries would promote the interests of firms that might develop re-
lated products in the future.6
This article will use the NIH patent controversy as a focal point
for considering when the results of government-sponsored research
should be patented and when they should be dedicated to the public
domain. First, this article will review the recent history of federal gov-
ernment policy on patenting the results of government-sponsored re-
search. Next, this article will highlight some of the complexities in-
volved in achieving technology transfer from the public sector to the
private sector that current policy may oversimplify. With this back-
ground, this article will return to a more detailed analysis of the NIH
cDNA patenting controversy and consider the lessons it may hold for
technology transfer policy generally.
II. PATENTING THE RESULTS OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
RESEARCH
U.S. policy since 1980 has reflected an increasingly confident pre-
sumption that patenting discoveries made in the course of government-
sponsored research is the most effective way to promote technology
transfer and commercial development of those discoveries in the private
sector. Whereas policymakers of prior generations may have thought
that the best way to achieve widespread use of the results of govern-
ment-sponsored research was to make them freely available to the pub-
lic,7 advocates of the new patenting strategy stress the need for exclu-
sive rights as an incentive for industry to undertake the further costly
investment necessary to bring new products to market."
This new strategy is justified in terms of both trade policy and
technology policy. The trade policy argument is that, although the
United States leads the world in basic research and in the creation of
new technologies, other nations do a better job of commercializing and
6. Association of Biotechnology Companies, ABC Statement on NIH Patent Filing for the
Human Genome Project (May 1992); Industrial Biotechnology Ass'n, IBA Position Paper: Rec-
ommended Federal Policy Concerning Human Genetic Sequences Discovered by Federal Re-
searchers, Contractors and Grantees (June 1992); Letter from G.J. Mossinghoff, President, Phar-
maceutical Manufacturers Association, to L.W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human
Services (May 28, 1992) (on file with author). These statements are analyzed in Eisenberg, Genes,
supra note 2, at 907 and in Adler, supra note 2, at 912-913. Since the time that the position
papers were released, the Industrial Biotechnology Association and the Association of Biotechnol-
ogy companies have merged to form the Biotechnology Industry Organization.
7. See, e.g., H.G. Rickover, Government Patent Policy, 60 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 14 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 2; Healy, supra note 2.
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
adopting new technologies in the private sector." As a result, U.S. firms
lose sales to foreign manufacturers of goods based on technologies pio-
neered in the United States. The competitiveness of U.S. firms in world
markets might be enhanced by leveraging U.S. strengths in research
into a position of international dominance in applied technology. 10
The technology policy argument is that government-sponsored ba-
sic research discoveries that have been dedicated to the public domain
have not been picked up by the private sector and developed into com-
mercial products." If the economy needs a steady infusion of new tech-
nologies to improve worker productivity and to grow, what is needed is
a mechanism for inducing the private sector to tap into the wealth of
new knowledge emerging from government and university research. In-
ventions that are made freely available to anyone who wants them are
presumed to languish in government and university archives rather
than to be actively exploited by all. 2
The strategy for advancing these twin policy goals, in keeping with
the privatization ethos of the 1980s, was to offer up the results of gov-
ernment-sponsored research for private appropriation by U.S. industry
through the mechanism of licenses under government- and university-
owned patents. Exclusive patent licenses from a government agency or
university would make it profitable for U.S. industry to develop prod-
ucts that would be too risky or too costly to pursue if the discoveries
were left in the public domain, leaving competitors free to enter the
market once it was established. Technology transfer, facilitated by pat-
ent rights, would generate new products for U.S. consumers and create
jobs for U.S. workers while protecting U.S. firms from foreign
competition.
Curiously, although the primary motive behind this patent policy
appears to have been a desire to benefit U.S. industry, the primary im-
petus to get it enacted into law seems to have come from the govern-
ment, with the support of universities, rather than from the private sec-
tor. And as industry has been slow to go for the bait of patent licenses
9. See generally NATIONAL ACAD. OF ENG.. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL
TECHNOLOGY 54-70 (1991) (discussing strengths and weaknesses of U.S. technical enterprise).
10. See generally COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENG'G AND PUB. POLICY, NATIONAL ACAD. OF
SCIENCES. NATIONAL ACAD. OF ENG'G, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN CI-
VILIAN TECHNOLOGY: BUILDING A NEW ALLIANCE (1992).
11. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECH. & COMPETITIVENESS, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, &
TECH., U.S. HOUSE OF REP., 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Technology Transfer from Federal Laborato-
ries and Universities (1992).
12. See id. at 3.
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in government-sponsored research discoveries, the government has not
wavered from the patenting strategy but has instead fortified it by ex-
tending it to cover even more discoveries.13
In 1980, Congress passed two statutes that have since set the
course for government technology transfer policy. The first of these
statutes, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980,14
made technology transfer an integral part of the research and develop-
ment responsibilities of federal laboratories and their employees. That
statute contains the following candid acknowledgement of ignorance re-
garding the impact of patents on technology development:
The Congress finds and declares that:
(7) Government antitrust, economic, trade, patent, procurement, regula-
tory, research and development, and tax policies have significant impacts
upon industrial innovation and development of technology, but there is in-
sufficient knowledge of their effects in particular sectors of the economy."&
Subsequent Congressional enactments have been far less cautious,
seeming to take it as established that patenting research results will
always be favorable for the development of technology. 16
The second of the two 1980 statutes, commonly known as the
Bayh-Dole Act,17 focused more explicitly on the role of patents in tech-
nology transfer. It reversed the prior practice of those federal agencies
that retained public ownership of inventions made outside the govern-
ment with federal funds. Under the Bayh-Dole Act, small businesses
and nonprofit organizations that were sufficiently diligent in seeking
patent rights and promoting commercial development of inventions
could retain patent ownership themselves. 18 Large businesses making
inventions with federal money were initially excluded from this new
policy.' 9 In February of 1983, however, President Reagan, by executive
order,20 extended the benefits of the Bayh-Dole Act to all government
contractors, including large businesses. This allowed all recipients of
13. Id.
14. Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-14
(1988)).
15. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3701(7) (1988).
16. See infra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
17. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-27 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-211 (1988)).
18. Id.; 94 Stat. 3015, 3020-21, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
19. Id.; 94 Stat. 3015, 3036, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 210(b) (1988).
20. Presidential Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Sub-
ject: Government Patent Policy, 1983 PUB. PAPERS 248 (Feb. 18, 1983).
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federal research funds to retain patent ownership on inventions made in
their laboratories with those funds.
Congress passed a series of amendments to Bayh-Dole in 1984.
These amendments extended its provisions to inventions originating at
government-owned, contractor-operated facilities, and repealed limita-
tions on the permissible duration of licenses from nonprofit organiza-
tions to large businesses on government-sponsored inventions.21 Then,
with the passage of the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986,22
Congress authorized federal laboratories to enter into "cooperative re-
search and development agreements" (CRADAs) with entities in both
the public and private sectors. That Act allowed the laboratories to
agree in advance to assign or license any patents on inventions made by
federal employees in the course of collaborative research to the collabo-
rating party.
Subsequent legislation and executive orders have continued to
broaden and fortify the emerging pro-patent policy.23 Today, we have a
system in place that virtually guarantees that whether federally-spon-
sored inventions are made in government, university, or private labora-
tories, anyone involved in the research project who wants the discovery
to be patented may prevail over the objections of anyone who thinks
the discovery should be placed in the public domain. Thus, for example,
the sponsoring agency may insist on obtaining a patent even if a univer-
sity is reluctant to patent a discovery made in its laboratories with fed-
eral funds.24 If a government agency or university has no interest in
21. Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335.
22. Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (amending the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Inno-
vation Act of 1980).
23. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-
484, Division C, Title XXXI, Subtitle C, § 3135(b), 106 Stat. 2315, 2640-41; Proclamation No.
6489, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,249 (1992); American Technology Preeminence Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-245, Title I, § 108, 106 Stat. 7, 13; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title VIII, Part C, §§ 827-828; 104 Stat. 1485, 1606-07; National
Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-189, Division C, Title XXXI,
Part C, 103 Stat. 1352, 1674-79; Technology Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418
Title V, Subtitle B, Part I, Subpart B, 102 Stat. 1107, 1433-39; National Technical Information
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-519, Title II, Subtitle B, 102 Stat. 2589, 2594-96; Exec. Order No.
12,591, 3 C.F.R. 221 (1987); Exec. Order No. 12,618 3 C.F.R. 262 (1987). The trend continues
in currently pending legislation. See, e.g., S. 1537, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) and H.R. 3590,
103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (directing all federal laboratories to assign to their private sector
partners the title to any intellectual property arising from a CRADA); H.R. 3550, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (establishing a "Technology Transfer and Commercialization Corporation" to act
as the federal government's agent in facilitating the transfer of patents, licenses, processes and
technologies for commercialization in the private sector).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1),(2) (1988).
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pursuing a patent, the individual inventor may step in and claim patent
rights. 5 If anyone with the sophistication and resources to pursue pat-
ent rights sees money to be made through patenting a government-
sponsored research discovery, chances are it will be patented. For some
agencies, this policy has called for a 180-degree turnaround in their
positions on ownership of the results of government-sponsored research
over the past decade and a half.26 The policy has been justified as a
means of improving productivity in American industry, of ensuring that
the results of taxpayer-supported research are translated into useful
products and processes, of giving American industry a competitive edge
in the international economy and of achieving "uniformity" in federal
policy in this area and thereby simplifying the "bureaucratic maze"
confronting would-be developers of products emanating from govern-
ment-sponsored research discoveries.27
III. DOES PRESENT POLICY OVERSIMPLIFY THE PROBLEM?
Now, all of this makes sense if we want all government-sponsored
research discoveries to be patented. But do we? That has been an arti-
cle of faith since 1980 in federal patent policy. We have assumed that
discoveries left in the public domain will not be used, and that granting
exclusive rights in discoveries to businesses will ensure their commer-
cial exploitation for the benefit of consumers, taxpayers, and the U.S.
economy. Indeed, our present statutes come pretty close to reflecting a
conclusive presumption that this is so. But is it so in fact?
The answer to this question ultimately turns on empirical ques-
tions with no clear answers. In all likelihood, the answer will vary from
one field to the next and from one discovery to the next. Intuitively, the
strong pro-patent tilt of current policy seems like a vast oversimplifica-
tion of the enormously complex task of achieving technology transfer
across the broad spectrum of discoveries emanating from federally-
sponsored research.
One dimension to this complexity arises from the fact that technol-
ogy transfer requires extensive back and forth communication among
25. 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 3710(d) (1988).
26. See James A. Dobkin, Patent Policy in Government Research and Development Con-
tracts, 53 VA. L. REV. 564 (1967); Edward C. Walterseheid, The Need for a Uniform Govern-
ment Patent Policy: The D.O.E. Example, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103 (1990).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1-3 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6460-62; SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECH. AND COMPETITIVENESS. COMMITTEE ON
SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECH., 102d Cong., 2d Sess., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM FEDERAL LAB-
ORATORIES AND UNIVERSITIES (1992).
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different types of institutions and among researchers and technology
users who speak to each other across significant cultural divides. In
some fields, researchers in government and university laboratories share
norms of openness that conflict with commercial interests in secrecy.28
Patent rights may sometimes reduce this difficulty by providing intel-
lectual property rights that survive disclosure; at other times concerns
about preserving the patentability of future discoveries might fortify
commercial incentives to maintain secrecy and thereby aggravate the
conflict between the cultures of research science and industry.29 Any
policy that promotes widespread patenting of government-sponsored re-
search results would thus seem to call for evaluating and managing the
impact of patents on the research enterprise.
Even setting aside the culture of academic research and focusing
exclusively on the perspective of industry, current policy appears to
oversimplify a complex problem. Patents may make a good deal of
sense as a means of facilitating technology transfer for some govern-
ment-sponsored discoveries, but there are reasons to suspect that they
make little sense for others. Neither the old-fashioned idea of leaving
all new discoveries in the public domain nor the newer idea of assigning
exclusive rights in such discoveries to private parties should be uni-
formly applied across the entire range of publicly-supported discoveries.
In our eagerness to avoid the inadequacies of the public domain ap-
proach, we may have moved too quickly and too emphatically in the
opposite direction, to the point where today patent rights in some gov-
ernment-sponsored discoveries may actually be undermining, rather
than supporting, incentives to develop new products and bring them to
market.
The course of scientific discovery and product development is infi-
nitely complex, variable and unpredictable. Uniformity in technology
transfer policy may therefore be a false ideal. Rather than having a
single, uniform government patent policy that works well for some dis-
coveries in some fields and badly for other discoveries in other fields, we
might be better served by a policy that acknowledges the limits of our
understanding and leaves more discretion for agencies to determine on
a case-by-case basis whether the public interest would be better served
by obtaining patent protection or by leaving certain basic research dis-
coveries in the public domain.
28. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 5.
29. Id. at 207-17.
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IV. THE NIH cDNA PATENTING CONTROVERSY
One example of the inadequacy in federal technology transfer pol-
icy is the reaction of industry trade groups to the NIH cDNA patent
applications. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA)
and the Industrial Biotechnology Association (IBA) both urged that
NIH not seek patent protection on DNA sequences whose biological
function is unknown, but instead place such sequences in the public
domain.30 A third group, the Association of Biotechnology Companies
(ABC), supported the NIH decision to seek patent protection, but only
as a means of generating revenues for the government and not as a
means of ensuring the availability of exclusive rights in those sequences
for firms.31 Indeed, even ABC urged that the patents be licensed on a
nonexclusive basis to avoid blocking development projects in industry.
Although this position is nominally consistent with current federal pat-
ent policy, it contradicts its underlying rationale by conceding that, at
least in this particular case, exclusive rights in these discoveries could
interfere with their effective commercial development.3 2
A. The Irony of Privatization Through Government Licensing
Why might U.S. industry object to NIH's pursuit of these patent
rights? First, they may not want NIH to have the power to grant or
deny licenses to develop genome-related products. There is an essential
irony in using government-owned patents to achieve technology trans-
fer-this strategy places a government agency in a licensing role for
the purpose of promoting privatization. If NIH holds patent rights to a
significant portion of the human genome, they may use their position as
licensor to regulate the development of genome-related products. Ex-
clusive licenses under NIH patents include "reasonable pricing"
clauses that permit NIH to monitor the reasonableness of prices
charged for licensed products. 33 Exclusive and non-exclusive NIH li-
censes include "domestic manufacturing" clauses that are mandated by
30. Industrial Biotechnology Ass'n, supra note 6; Letter from G.J. Mossinghoff to L.W.
Sullivan, supra note 6.
31. Association of Biotechnology Cos., supra note 6.
32. Generating royalty income for the government was not among the justifications ad-
vanced by NIH in support of its patent applications. See Healy, supra note 2, at 665 ("The
rationale is not to make money, but rather to promote and encourage the development and com-
mercialization of products to benefit the public, and to do so in a socially responsible way.").
33. NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Patent License Agree-
ment-Exclusive, Model 930201, 5.03.
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statute,34 requiring the licensee to manufacture products in the United
States.35 These provisions tie the hands of industry and limit the profit-
ability of products developed under even an exclusive patent license.
Firms may be particularly wary of NIH in view of its recent role
in authorizing a generic drug manufacturer to pursue NIH's claim
against Burroughs Wellcome to patent rights in the use of the drug
azidothymidine (AZT) to treat people infected with the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus (HIV) .36 Burroughs Wellcome initially identified
AZT as a potential agent for combatting retroviruses such as HIV
while screening multiple compounds for antiretroviral activity against
two murine retroviruses, and subsequently decided to file a patent ap-
plication covering the use of AZT as an HIV therapy.37 Burroughs
Wellcome then sent a sample of AZT to NIH to be screened for activ-
ity against HIV in human cells, and the NIH screening test confirmed
that AZT did indeed show such activity.38 The company subsequently
obtained FDA approval to market AZT for treating HIV-infected per-
sons. Considerable public controversy followed over the price charged
by Burroughs Wellcome for AZT.39 In an effort to get Burroughs
Wellcome to reduce the price, NIH asserted that its participation in
screening AZT for anti-HIV activity entitled it to claim co-ownership
of the Burroughs Wellcome patents.40 NIH granted a non-exclusive li-
cense to Barr Laboratories, a generic drug manufacturer, to exploit any
patent rights NIH might have in the Burroughs Wellcome patents and
authorized Barr Laboratories to assert the government's claim of in-
ventorship in those patents.4 1 Barr Laboratories filed an Abbreviated
New Drug Application with the FDA seeking approval to manufacture
34. 35 U.S.C. § 209(d) (1988).
35. NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 33, at 1 5.01; NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Patent License Agreement-Nonexclusive, Model 9030201, T
4.01.
36. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1208 (E.D.N.C. 1993);
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D.N.C. 1993); People with
AIDS Health Group v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 578 (D.C.C. Jan. 17,
1992).
37. Burroughs Wellcome, 828 F. Supp. at 1211.
38. Id.
39. See. e.g., Philip J. Hilts, Wave of Protests Developing on Profits From AIDS Drug,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1989, § 1, at 1; AIDS, Drugs, Need and Greed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1989,
§ A, at 34.
40. See Agency Wants to End AIDS Drug Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1991, § A, at
24.
41. Burroughs Wellcome, 828 F. Supp. at 1202; People With AIDS, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS at *5-6 & n.5.
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and distribute a generic version of AZT.42 Burroughs Wellcome sued
Barr Laboratories for patent infringement and ultimately prevailed on
a motion for summary judgment, with the district court holding that
NIH scientists were not co-inventors of the patented inventions.
Whatever the merits of NIH's position in the AZT litigation from
a public health perspective, from the vantage point of industry, this
episode highlights the ambivalence of NIH towards profit-maximiza-
tion in the marketing of health-related products. In the case of AZT,
NIH pursued patent rights not to facilitate commercial development,
but to pressure a firm to reduce the price charged for a product that
was already a commercial success. This suggests that there are limits to
the potential profitability of products developed under an NIH license,
and given the choice, industry might prefer not to have to accept those
limits.
B. NIH Patent Rights As An Obstacle To Further Innovation
Second, the patent rights NIH sought may have seemed unneces-
sary to protect the profit expectations of the biotechnology industry.
The current government patent policy is based on a simple model of
technology transfer in which a patent on a government-sponsored in-
vention is the only source of exclusivity on the horizon for firms seeking
to develop related commercial products. Commercial products in indus-
tries that make use of patents, such as the pharmaceutical industry,
however, typically embody multiple patented inventions. If a firm has
its own patent rights in a product that are adequate to protect its mar-
ket position, NIH patent rights covering the same product (or covering
inventions that are necessary to develop or market the product) may be
nothing more than an annoyance to the firm. At their best, patents
provide essential incentives to undertake costly product development
that would not otherwise be profitable. At their worst, they create ob-
stacles to subsequent research and development and add to the thicket
of rights that firms must negotiate their way past before they can bring
new products to market. If government patent rights are not only un-
necessary to provide market exclusivity, but also come with burden-
some restrictions on pricing and place of manufacture, firms may see
them more as a regulatory hurdle than as an incentive to innovation.
At the time NIH filed its patent applications, its representatives
expressed concern that subsequent inventions made by firms in develop-
42. Burroughs Wellcome, 828 F. Supp. at 1210.
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ing products related to the sequences would be deemed obvious and
therefore unpatentable in light of the disclosed NIH sequences. 3 If
firms shared this expectation, one would have expected them to support
NIH's decision to pursue patent rights and to urge that these patent
rights be licensed on an exclusive basis. For the most part, however,
they did not do so; indeed, even the one biotechnology trade association
to endorse NIH's pursuit of patent rights urged that the sequence in-
formation be licensed on a non-exclusive basis. Perhaps these firms
were short-sighted, and in the end they will find that their further prod-
uct development efforts yield no new patentable inventions. Nonethe-
less, firms make their investment decisions on the basis of their own
expectations rather than the expectations of government agencies such
as NIH. If they foresee that the NIH patent rights will be an obstacle,
rather than an incentive, to research and development, that expectation
could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
C. The Likely Scope of NIH Patent Rights And Their Effect On
Market Position
Third, NIH patents may be ineffective in protecting the market
position of innovating firms. Patent rights are most likely to be effective
in promoting product development when they ensure the patent holder
or licensee a commercially effective monopoly in the relevant product
market. Whether NIH patents would have had this effect depends on
the scope of patent rights NIH would have been able to obtain. Gener-
ally, the most effective commercial protection, and therefore the most
powerful incentive to invest in product development, is provided by a
patent on an end product that is sold to consumers. Subject to the
availability of substitute products that are outside the scope of the pat-
ent, such a patent confers a right to exclude competitors from the mar-
ket for the patented product entirely, regardless of how they make it or
what they use it for. Partial DNA sequences of unknown function may
in the end turn out to be marketable as end products, perhaps in a
diagnostic test kit to detect the presence of disease genes. It is more
likely, however, that they will be useful as research tools to find the
full-length genes to which they correspond and to make the products
for which those genes code.
The NIH patent applications include claims to these full-length
genes, on the theory that by disclosing how to use the partial sequences
43. Adler, supra note 2, at 912; Healy, supra note 2, at 667.
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as probes to find the full genes NIH has provided an enabling disclo-
sure of how to make them. A patent applicant need not have actually
reduced an invention to tangible form before patenting it, so long as the
applicant supplies a written disclosure that would enable other skilled
investigators working in the same field to make and use the claimed
invention without undue experimentation.4 4 Although the NIH applica-
tion does not disclose either the complete DNA sequences for the genes
that have been partially sequenced or the proteins that they code for, it
does provide a general description of how to use the partial sequences
as probes to find the full genes and how to achieve expression of the
gene products once the full genes have been found. Nevertheless, under
recent court decisions, it appears unlikely that NIH would have been
able to obtain patents on the full genes without setting forth their full
sequences.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears
appeals from decisions of the PTO as well as from federal district
courts throughout the United States in patent infringement actions, has
taken a restrictive approach to allowing patents on DNA sequences in
recent decisions. For example, in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceuti-
cal Co.,45 the Federal Circuit considered when rival inventors of the
same gene could claim to have first "conceived" of the invention for
purposes of establishing priority of invention.46 The court held that an
inventor who has not yet isolated a gene should not be deemed to have
conceived of the invention until he or she is able "to envision [its] de-
tailed constitution . . . so as to distinguish it from other materials, as
well as a method for obtaining it."'47 More recently, in the case of Fiers
v. Revel,48 the same court considered competing claims to priority of
invention of the DNA sequence for human fibroblast beta-interferon.
Two of the three parties claimed priority on the basis of a disclosure of
the protein and a method for isolating the corresponding DNA. The
court assumed that the method for isolating the DNA was enabling,
but nonetheless, relying on its prior decision in Amgen, rejected the
44. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
45. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
46. Under U.S. patent law priority of invention depends on the date on which the invention
was conceived, the date on which it was actually or constructively reduced to practice, and the
diligence of an inventor who was first to conceive but last to reduce to practice. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g) (1988).
47. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206.
48. 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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priority claims of these inventors in favor of the third party who was
the first to disclose the actual DNA sequence for the gene. The court
noted that until the actual structure of the gene was known, disclosure
of a method of making it was insufficient either to establish a concep-
tion of the gene or to satisfy the written disclosure requirement of the
patent statute.4 9 Taken together, these decisions suggest that NIH's
description of a method for using its partial sequences to obtain the full
coding sequences would have been inadequate to support patent claims
to genes that they had not yet isolated and disclosed in their patent
applications. If so, then NIH would have been limited to narrower
claims to the specific partial cDNA sequences that are actually set
forth in the applications.
Such limited patent rights would probably not offer effective pro-
tection to firms seeking to bring related products to market, and the
argument for obtaining patents as a means of promoting product devel-
opment would lose its force. The partial DNA sequences themselves are
primarily useful as tools for research and development. Not only is it
difficult to detect and prove infringement of such a patent, but often
the only effective remedy, even for proven infringement, will be dam-
ages. This is because an injunction against future use of the invention
will not thwart the efforts of a competitor who has already finished
using the invention. One could argue for a substantial damage remedy
if use of the patented product was an essential step in developing a
lucrative product, and if infringement is willful the court has discretion
to treble the amount of damages. 50 If the competitor no longer needs to
use the patented invention in the manufacturing stage, however, an in-
junction against future infringement would not serve to keep the com-
petitor off the market.
Firms that are interested in developing end products for sale to
consumers are unlikely to see patents on research tools, which are used
only at the research and development stage, as a very effective means
of promoting their market exclusivity. Instead, they will see such pat-
ents as potential stumbling blocks that they need to negotiate their way
past in order to develop their products. Such patents may generate roy-
alty income for their owners, and the prospect of earning royalties may
make it more profitable to develop further research tools in the private
49. Id. at 1169-71.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988).
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sector, but it is unlikely to enhance the incentives of firms to develop
end products through the use of those research tools.
51
There are reasons to be wary of patents on research tools. Negoti-
ating licenses for access to research tools may present particularly diffi-
cult problems for would-be licensees, who might not want to" disclose
the directions of their research in its early stages by requesting a li-
cense.5 2 Moreover, a significant research project might benefit from ac-
cess to a great many research tools; if each of these tools requires a
separate license and royalty payment, the costs and administrative bur-
den could mount quickly. Patent holders may find it more lucrative to
license research tool patents on an exclusive rather than nonexclusive
basis, in the process choking off the research and development of other
firms before they get off the ground.
For years biomedical research has flourished while investigators
have drawn heavily upon discoveries that their predecessors left in the
public domain. Even if exclusive rights enhance private incentives to
develop further research tools, they could do considerable damage to
the research enterprise by inhibiting the effective utilization of existing
ones.
Patents on research tools may thus offer ineffective commercial
protection to firms that use the tools to develop new products for con-
sumers, while potentially interfering with research and development
within those firms. Moreover, the more research that remains to be
done to develop a product, the more likely it is that the innovating firm
will make further patentable inventions of its own that are more likely
to be incorporated in the final product. Such patents are likely to be far
51. On the other hand, one firm's research tool may be another firm's end product. This is
particularly so in the contemporary biotechnology industry, where research is big business and
there is money to be made by developing and marketing research tools for the use of other firms.
So, for example, even as the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and the Industrial Bio-
technology Association were calling upon NIH to leave its cDNA sequence information in the
public domain, new firms were being formed to do further cDNA sequencing in the private sector,
presumably with the hope of obtaining their own patent rights. See Lawrence M. Fisher, Mining
the Genome: Big Science as Big Business, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 30, 1994, § 1, at I; Nicholas Wade,
Scientist at Work: J. Craig Venter; A Bold Short Cut to Human Genes, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22,
1994, § C, at 1. It may well make sense to have this particular task performed in the private
sector, and patents may enhance the incentives of firms to step in. On the other hand, it may make
more sense to leave this information in the public domain, even if that means that the government
has to continue to bear the cost of generating it.
52. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1017 (1989).
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more important to the firm's profit expectations than exclusive access to
any particular research tool.
V. OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PATENTING GOVERNMENT-SUP-
PORTED RESEARCH DISCOVERIES
The policy agenda behind patenting government-sponsored re-
search discoveries is not limited to enhancing the profit expectations of
the firms that develop products out of these discoveries. As outlined
above, this patenting strategy has also been justified in part as a means
of promoting U.S. interests in international trade and protecting the
jobs of U.S. workers. 53 Another function of government-held patents,
suggested by the controversy over the role of NIH in identifying the
drug AZT as a useful agent in treating AIDS patients,'5 is to allow a
government agency to exercise control over the prices charged for prod-
ucts emerging from government-sponsored research. Even if patents on
government research discoveries may weaken the incentives of innovat-
ing firms in some cases, might they still be justified as a means of fur-
thering the interests of other constituents, such as U.S. consumers, em-
ployees, and taxpayers?
A. Patents as a Revenue Source
The idea of using patents to earn a return on taxpayer-supported
research has a certain superficial appeal. Consumers, however, have to
pay patent royalties in the form of higher prices in order for taxpayers
to collect them in the form of revenues in government coffers. Given
the high costs of obtaining patents and entering into license agree-
ments, the scheme makes little sense if the consumers and taxpayers
are essentially the same people. It may make more sense if patent roy-
alties are to be paid by foreign consumers who do not share in the tax
burden that supported the research. To the extent that patenting gov-
ernment-sponsored research discoveries is justified as a means of com-
pelling foreign consumers to share in the costs of U.S. research, how-
ever, the patent protection that matters arises under foreign rather
than U.S. laws. Patents are territorial in scope; in order to collect pat-
ent royalties from foreign consumers, it is necessary to obtain foreign
patents.5 5 This argues against pursuing patent protection for types of
53. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
54. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
55. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) ("Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee
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biotechnology discoveries that are excluded from protection under for-
eign patent laws. The need for multiple patent filings abroad increases
the costs associated with obtaining patent protection, although it may
also increase revenues collected on inventions that are commercially
successful.
Another argument for using patents on government-sponsored re-
search discoveries as a revenue source is that patent royalties may pro-
vide an additional source of funds for subsequent research at a time
when research funding is increasingly difficult to obtain through the
political process. However appealing this argument may be to research
institutions, it is not clear why Congress would want to provide these
institutions with a mechanism for bypassing legislative control over
their research budgets. Moreover, the persuasiveness of this argument
as a policy matter would seem to turn on whether it is more appropri-
ate for the costs of research in public institutions to be supported by
consumers or by taxpayers. If there is significant overlap in these two
populations, it is unclear whether the costs of obtaining, licensing and
enforcing patent rights are justified.
A further difficulty in justifying patents on government-sponsored
research discoveries as a revenue source is that so far they do not seem
to be a very effective way of raising money. Public institutions remain
ever hopeful that their investment in technology transfer activities will
pay off, but so far, with a few notable exceptions, these investments
have not been very profitable.56
B. Patents as a Means of Protecting the Interests of Consumers
A further justification for patenting the results of government-
sponsored research is that patent rights may give public agencies a
mechanism for controlling prices charged for products emanating from
government-sponsored research. This argument is not generally ad-
vanced by supporters of such patents, but is nonetheless suggested by
the AZT patent controversy. The standard form exclusive patent li-
cense agreement employed by NIH includes a provision by which licen-
sees agree to submit documentation showing a reasonable relationship
...of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States." (emphasis added)).
56. See ASSOCIATION OF UNIV. TECH. MGRS., THE AUTM LICENSING SURVEY EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY AND SELECTED DATA FISCAL YEARS 1991 AND 1992 (1993).
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between the pricing of a licensed product, the public investment in that
product and the health and safety needs of the public.5
The wisdom of having government agencies monitor and control
prices charged by private firms is a topic of long-standing debate. In
the U.S. political system, free market advocates have increasingly pre-
vailed in this debate over the past twenty years as the U.S. government
has dismantled the regulatory apparatus in one industry after another.
Nevertheless, the balance may tip the other way for pharmaceutical
products in the current political climate for health care reform. The
Clinton administration has made controlling health care costs a top pri-
ority. As the government increasingly finds itself in the role of chief
customer for pharmaceutical products, pressure to control this particu-
lar element of health care costs will inevitably grow.
It is by no means clear that government-held patent rights are a
necessary or efficient means of holding down pharmaceutical prices, but
it may seem like a politically expedient place to begin. Reasonable pric-
ing clauses in patent licenses do less violence to the prevailing free mar-
ket ethos than price controls imposed indiscriminately on firms without
regard to whether they are marketing government-supported inven-
tions. On the other hand, by limiting the profitability of products devel-
oped under a license, reasonable pricing clauses can be expected to
make government patent licenses less attractive to firms.
C. Patents as a Means of Protecting the Interests of U.S. Employees
A final justification for patenting the results of government-spon-
sored research is that such patents may be used to protect U.S. jobs.
This reason is more prominent than revenue enhancement or price con-
trol in the statutory scheme. The Bayh-Dole Act requires that institu-
tions receiving title to inventions made with federal funds give a prefer-
ence in awarding exclusive licenses to licensees who will agree to
manufacture the invention substantially in the United States. 8 Federal
agencies are subject to a similar requirement in granting licenses to
federally-owned inventions,5" as is reflected in the terms of the standard
NIH form license agreements.6 0 The Federal Technology Transfer Act
further requires federal agencies entering into CRADAs to give a pref-
erence to businesses located in the United States that agree to manu-
57. NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 33, at 1 5.03.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 204 (1988).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 209(b) (1988).
60. See supra note 35.
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facture inventions substantially in the United States.6' This suggests a
further agenda of using patent rights to ensure that any jobs created
through the development of products out of government-sponsored re-
search discoveries go to U.S. workers rather than their foreign counter-
parts. It is not clear how effective government patents are as a mecha-
nism for protecting or creating U.S. jobs, nor how many jobs might be
at stake. At some level this strategy runs counter to the free trade
thrust of current U.S. policy in international trade. Nonetheless, the
protection of U.S. jobs is a politically compelling goal that is not neces-
sarily congruent with the interests of firms obtaining licenses under
government- or university-owned patents.
VI. CONCLUSION
The present policy of promoting patents on federally-supported in-
ventions has rapidly become entrenched in U.S. law, although it is not
clear that this policy always serves its underlying agenda of furthering
the transfer of new technologies to the private sector for commercial
development. Whether the policy serves other goals of generating roy-
alty income, holding down the cost to consumers of government-sup-
ported inventions, or protecting U.S. jobs is unclear. The recent contro-
versy over the pursuit of patent rights by NIH in thousands of gene
fragments of unknown function highlights some of the complexities in-
volved in technology transfer that the current uniform policy fails to
take into account.
Retreating from the pro-patent policy may be difficult at this
stage. Although the initial impetus behind the present policy does not
appear to have come from industry, industry adjusts to the profit incen-
tives created by existing government policies. Particularly when govern-
ment policy creates and distributes new property rights, it is inevitable
that someone will protest if those rights are later taken away. It does
not necessarily follow that those property rights are on balance creating
new social value that makes all of us better off.
Patents undoubtedly have a critical role to play in facilitating
technology transfer in some contexts. Nevertheless, they can also inter-
fere with technology transfer and with the broader goal of promoting
continuing technological progress. These goals may sometimes be better
served by allocating new knowledge to the public domain. Government
is uniquely situated to enrich the public domain. We should be wary of
61. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(4)(B) (1988).
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disabling the government from performing this critical function in our
eagerness to enhance private incentives to put existing discoveries to
use.
